

In Parenthesis Workshop Programme
Friday 17th March – Saturday 18th March 2017

Friday Evening: Film and Dinner at Newcastle Side Cinema and Ury Restaurant, 6.30–10pm

6.30 – 7pm Drinks reception @Side Cinema, Newcastle
7 - 8pm Durham Philosophy Society presents edited film shorts of the Wartime Women
8pm -10pm Dinner (@Ury Restaurant, Quayside, Newcastle)

Saturday March 18th: Workshop Programme

9.30 – 10: *In Parenthesis Introduction*

10 – 12: *Wartime and Intellectual Context*

Mary Midgley
Nakul Krishna
Sophia Connell
Maarten Steenhagen
Christopher Coope
Ian Ground + Mike Bavidge
Jane Heal

Key Questions

- Who remained in Oxford during the war and who left?
- What impact did the war have on the group's philosophical education?
- What were the dominant methodologies and philosophical trends in British philosophy in the 1930s and 1940s? In Oxford philosophy? In Oxford moral philosophy?

12 – 2: *Lunch and optional visit to the Midgley Archive, Durham Special Collections*

2 – 3.45: *The Wartime Group*

Miles Leeson
Hannah Marije Altorf
Jen Hornsby
Andrew Bowyer
Liz McKinnell
Frances White

Key Questions

- What is the primary philosophical focus of each of the members?
- Does the group share a distinctive methodology / philosophical outlook?
- What common themes or theses emerge in their work?

3.45 – 4: *Tea*

4 – 5.30: *Did it, and does it, matter*

that they were women?

Open discussion

Key Questions

- Is there any sense in which their philosophical approach, method or positions are distinctively those of women philosophers?
- Do the lives or philosophies of the group suggest any strategies for gender activism today?

5.30 – 7.30: Own time, or a foray into Durham for a drink

7.30: Dinner @Jumping Bean café, Durham

Women in Parenthesis: Anscombe, Midgley, Murdoch and Foot

In Parenthesis focusses on the lives, work and friendships of Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001), Philippa Foot (1920–2010), Mary Midgley (1919) and Iris Murdoch (1919–1999).

We are concerned to show that this group of female philosophers, all of whom studied at Oxford University during World War II, can be thought of as a philosophical school, united by a shared target, a shared methodology and an uncommonly sensible and realistic attitude toward human life and ethics. We are approaching their work in four strands: Human Nature, Ethics, Culture, and Freedom.

In the background is the question: How can we end the male domination of philosophy? This question was posed by Jo Wolff in his Guardian column in 2013, motivated by reflection on these four women. He observed that this ‘superb cohort of female philosophers [has remained] unmatched ... by anything we have seen since’:

Of course with small numbers it could be pure chance, but Anscombe, Foot, Murdoch and Midgley were all born in 1919 or 1920. They arrived in Oxford as undergraduates at the outbreak of war. Warnock came up a few years later, in October 1942, and she reports that Oxford felt "empty". Many of the male dons and students had left, either to join the army or crack codes at Bletchley Park. Could it be that these women were able to start and root their academic careers simply because they received the level of attention their talents deserved? When the men returned, these women were already more than their match. If they had been born 10 years earlier or later, would they have still received the support needed to break through a male-dominated field?

Mary Midgley responded:

As a survivor from the wartime group, I can only say: sorry, but the reason [why this was the golden age of female philosophy] was indeed that there were fewer men about. The trouble is not, of course, men as such – men have done good enough philosophy in the past – what is wrong is a particular style of philosophising that results from encouraging a lot of clever young men to compete in winning arguments... By contrast, in those wartime classes – which were small – men (conscientious objectors etc.) were present as well as women but they weren't keen on arguing. It is clear that we all were more interested in understanding this deeply puzzling world than in putting each other down.

Alongside our philosophical work, *In Parenthesis* seeks to recover the facts about these wartime intellectual conditions and to reflect on the structural and institutional conditions that may have contributed to this group of women philosophers emerging as a distinct set of philosophical voices in the 20th century. Through this we will explore the often polarising question as to whether there might be something distinctive about women's philosophical interests, their collaborative practices and preferred methodologies, as well as their substantive philosophical views. In addition to illuminating some of the more well-documented barriers to inclusion, there is scope to discover unknown factors and ultimately new strategies for gender activism within philosophy.

We are working with Liza Thompson at Bloomsbury Publishing. We will be bringing out four *Reader* volumes, on each of the four project themes (*Human Life, Ethics, Culture, Freedom*), starting in 2018. With Bloomsbury we will be developing teaching material around these collections.

We have recently acquired Mary Midgley's literary estate for the Durham University Special Collections. This material is currently being catalogued and will be available for study later in the year.

'Then and Now' by Mary Midgley

*Mary Midgley Considers How What Is Called Philosophy Has Changed Since She
And Her Friends First Plunged Into It*

1. Changes In World-Pictures.

When we four people started studying Philosophy at Oxford in the early 1940s, quite a lot of the topics that we might have expected to discuss - most importantly, Human Nature, the Spiritual Life and the Behaviour of non-human Animals - simply could not be mentioned in philosophical circles at all. First, Behaviourists had shown that there was 'no such thing as Human Nature'. All behaviour was simply reactive - produced by other behaviour. Next, Animal behaviour was part of Zoology. A few Comparative Psychologists were studying the differences between human and animal thought. But this chiefly meant showing that animals can't do certain things which humans can. And finally, as for the Spiritual Life, religious concepts were being studied on their own as separate topics by people who were not necessarily interested in their importance, or keen to relate them to other aspects of life.

Thus the only mental heritage that was deemed to be common to the whole human race was Rationality, which was seen as its central legacy from the Enlightenment. More sweepingly still, however, even that legacy was then being fiercely attacked by a miscellaneous group of theorists - ranging from Right to Left, from Behaviourists through Existentialists to Marxists - who denounced the whole concept of Human Nature as meaningless on political grounds, saying that all human conduct was due to cultural influences. Indeed, one cannot really convey to people trained in today's conventions and decent silences the depths of unspeakability that then attached to those two apparently innocent words 'Human Nature'. If we now compare this view with today's perspective, we shall surely be struck by seeing how much the area of Human Life has apparently expanded. Our map of it must now include, first, an exploration of the difference between our own and other life-forms and then a sketch of the evolutionary paths by which we have somehow developed from among them. And, although the social causes of human conduct are still taken seriously today, we now understand that, like any other species, humans do also have their own particular species-tendencies, their own inherited repertoire of feelings and behaviour. As Franz de Waal has pointed out, in some respects we do differ from the other primates, but in others we are quite like them. In fact, we humans are not just a rather oddly-shaped branch of octopi who happen to have become civilized. It is an essential fact about us that we have our own distinctive tastes and motives - our own nature among other primates.

This human nature must, however, then be seen against a still wider background than that perspective of other species. It has its own place in the cosmos, however mysterious that place may be. Ved Mehta reports (*Fly And The Fly-Bottle*, p.52), that when Iris Murdoch was asked how far she agreed with Miss Anscombe and Mrs Foot about moral philosophy, she replied that, despite their various differences, they were all 'united in their objection to Hare's view that the human being was the monarch of the universe', that he constructed his values from scratch'. They were concerned, she said, about 'the reality that surrounds man - transcendent or whatever'. And, as Tom Nagel has since pointed out (*Mind and Cosmos*), this is surely right. Whether it is a search for divinities or a search for dolphins that takes you beyond the human world, your curiosity surely can't be satisfied with the small, highly abstract human social scene depicted by recent philosophy.

I have written two books to examine the connexion between these two approaches - between the spiritual and the scientific exploration, in today's thinking (*Evolution As A Religion*, 1985 and *Science As Salvation*, 1992) Since writing them, I am increasingly struck by how ready people are to fill the imaginative gap left by traditional religion with material derived somehow from science, whether it is relevant or not. And I have pursued this matter in another book now in press, *Why Philosophize?* (Bloomsbury, forthcoming).

2. *Changes in Ethics*

Turning now from these changing thoughts about the great world to those within the smaller world of Oxford, I can record that, when we first started studying Moral Philosophy in the 1940s, the subject seemed to revolve entirely round forbidding people to derive value-judgments from facts. This ruling, officially based on a rather obscure remark of Hume's (*Treatise of Human Nature* book 1, part 1, section 1) had been formalized by G.E. Moore in 1903 as the duty to avoid the Naturalistic Fallacy - to stop deriving values from facts altogether. Since Natural Facts were believed to include all the facts about the real world, the veto on connecting them with morals was promptly used to attack, not only its obvious target, Utilitarianism, but all attempts to show that morality was important by connecting it with central aspects of life.

The result was something quite contrary to Moore's intentions. Moore had wanted to show that we perceive the goodness in the world directly, through responding to beauty in the context of art or love, rather than by reasoning our way to it through discovering facts. And he thought that this direct perception of goodness provided the central theme for our lives. But his more negatively-minded followers simply used the language of anti-naturalism to detach the whole topic of morals from the scientifically-perceived natural facts which (as they thought) constituted the whole of reality. By thus shifting the entire subject of ethics into the realm of the unreal, they made it seem to be only an outlying area of philosophy, a move which - not surprisingly - undermined its academic prestige.

This was not a complete change. Twentieth-century philosophers had already gradually moved their enquiries further away from ethics than would have seemed natural to either Plato or Kant. And meanwhile, a simple Materialism - a Materialism so taken for granted that it felt no need to proclaim itself - had become the favoured metaphysic of those who wanted to show that they were on the side of Progress. In this way, ever since Descartes, philosophical enquiries had increasingly come to centre on problems about knowledge of the physical world, while Russell had been focussing on Logic in a way that narrowed and formalized them still further.

Thus certain materialistic Forms of Thought were increasingly seen as the real subject of philosophical enquiries, and it seemed like a distraction from these to study the more varied and detailed ways of thinking that prevail in real life - such as ethics. Moral judgments were seen, at first just as emotional attitudes, then (rather more realistically) as 'prescriptions'. social attitudes which must be consistent but which could not be explained or defended. Questions about what is right or wrong had become matters on which you could take up a position, but which were essentially outside the realm of reason.

In this way, though Moral Philosophy was still unavoidably a part of the Oxford syllabus, it was seen as something marginal, perhaps even something it would be frivolous to attend to, almost like theology. And this happened at a time when, in the real world, moral problems were obviously even more pressing and obstreperous than usual - a time of war and violent change. It was not, I think, surprising that people like ourselves, coming fresh to this situation, thought something ought to be done about it.

3. *Looking For Signposts: Wittgenstein?*

Did that make us four into a Philosophical School?

This is a loose term, but the point is worth discussing. We did not at once become a 4-headed unanimous squad of prophets. We each followed our own diverging paths in various directions. But what, for me, makes the unanimity-story still important is a persisting memory of the four of us sitting in Philippa's front room and doing our collective best to answer the orthodoxies of the day, which we all saw as disastrous. As with many philosophical schools, the starting-point was a joint 'NO!'. No (that is) at once to divorcing Facts from Values, and - after a bit more preparation - also No to splitting mind off from matter. From this, a lot of metaphysical consequences would follow.

These conversations happened repeatedly during the five years when we were all in Oxford, 1945-50. And during that time I'm sure there was no marked disagreement among us. We were simply concerned to get the issues, on which we were all pretty well agreed, worked out more clearly - to get 'no' said plainly to the various creeds of the current orthodoxy. And of course we four people were not isolated; others were involved. Mary Warnock, slightly younger than us, was already participating because Elizabeth had insisted on teaching her about Wittgenstein's later thinking. And the rest of us already knew something about this because Elizabeth had already given us the 'Blue and Brown Books', loose-leaf bundles which outlined what later became his *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty*.

Wittgenstein is both so large and so confusing a figure that it is hard to say briefly how he influenced us. I would suggest simply, first, that he had an immense effect, and second that what he taught us was to be holistic - to fill in backgrounds. This means that we learnt from him not to let topics become isolated on their own, even when arguments about them had become caged, like parrots, within a particularly strong framework of current talk. I think a couple of quotations from *On Certainty* will make this point as well as anything -

I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness, nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No, it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. (94)

All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis, takes place already within a system. And the system is not a more or less arbitrary point of departure for all our arguments; no. It belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure as the element in which our arguments have their life. (105)

Wittgenstein, then, although he had made one immense jump from his early dogmatism in the *Tractatus* to the later work which celebrated realistic flexibility, was always shouting throughout that later period for one thing - for the real complexity and mutability of the actual world. Though we seldom met him, he was constantly there in our thoughts, urging us not to lose sight of that complexity, not to type-cast our topics to suit passing controversies.

I have emphasized the 'inherited background' here to point out how well this idea suited my own evolutionary interests, and how closely the argumentative habits of our time resembled the earlier prejudices of superficial evolutionists like T.H. Huxley, who never really took in the thought that they themselves, being still primates, were still closely related to the apes around them.

Throughout our lives, argumentative conventions like these had bound the professoriate down to smaller and smaller artificial mental territories and to less and less useful ideas about the victories they hoped for. And that, I think, is probably why we four people, despite our different backgrounds, so readily agreed in opposing them. .

4. Science, Nature and Life

This topic brings us to what has probably been the most important cultural change in the West between the 1930s and the present day, namely the gradual advance of Science from being seen as 'almost a Religion' to being treated as a Religion, directly and sans phrase.

This isn't, of course, a question of what people say. It's a matter of what they put their trust in. For a long time the British public officially claimed to place its reliance on God, and indeed people do still often call on His Name. But this reliance was steadily undermined during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment by the Wars of Religion, which revealed failures and scandals staining all the churches. Meanwhile, scientific research - which at first had seemed to be just an obscure part of religious activity - became increasingly successful and reached the affairs of everyday life, such as medicine. It also increasingly touched on questions that interest everybody, such as the shape of the world and the constitution of the human body.

The public therefore began to revere the physical sciences, especially Physics itself. Alexander Pope had already celebrated Physics, declaring that -

Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night,
God said 'Let Newton be!' and all was light.

But, by the twentieth century, many people no longer thought they needed to include God in this acknowledgment. The glory and prestige surrounding Science no longer seemed to centre on God, nor indeed on Nature, but chiefly on current scientists and their technology. And the fact that most people actually still knew very little about Science itself scarcely disturbed this general reverence, any more than a similar ignorance about theology had disturbed their forefathers' reverence for God,

It is interesting to see how this works. The sense of being part of a modern scientific age supports many people independently of actual scientific knowledge. They assume that they have escaped from the superstitions that misled their ancestors simply by being much cleverer than those ancestors. But is the confidence that they now feel in being protected by science any more rational - one might ask, any less superstitious? - than their forefathers' confidence in divine Providence? No doubt time will tell.

5. Freedom, Responsibility and Choice.

From the social point of view, the West's most important change in the last fifty years has surely been the political shift in the accepted meaning of Freedom. The move of the Conservative political parties from a mild, background Liberalism to a drastic Neo-Liberalism or Monetarism has altered everything. That move aims to reverse most of the progress which many of us think has been achieved in the pattern of our lives during the last century.

This new ideology is set out in Frederick Hayek's book *The Constitution of Liberty* - which was Margaret Thatcher's bible - and it begins its message by defining liberty in the narrowest possible way as 'the absence of coercion'. That is to say, the wider aspects of freedom - the unrestricted view, the feeling of unlimited choices, perhaps above all the sense of controlling one's own destiny - are held not to matter. Provided that you are not actually in prison, you are now deemed to be 'free' enough to enjoy all the values which Human Nature demands. These values rule that the defining characteristic of human relations is Competition. It is doomed that 'the fittest must - and will - always survive'. Democratic control of legislation is thus shown to be unnecessary. As George Monbiot explains, the Market on its own is deemed certain to discover -

a natural hierarchy of winners and losers, creating a more efficient system than could ever be devised through planning or by design. Anything that impedes this process, such as significant tax, regulation, trades-union activity or state provision, is therefore counter-productive. Unrestricted entrepreneurs will create the wealth that will trickle down to everyone.

This piece of bad economics, eagerly supported by bad history and still worse psychology, has not only been adopted by right-wing political parties. It has also, for some time, been expensively promoted by those who most obviously stand to gain by it - namely, by the Very Rich, both here and in the US - to such an extent that, as we have seen, many voters have been drawn into supporting it in recent elections and now accept it as a Faith. This story, which includes highbrow arguments from well-paid experts, is given force by a bogus general suggestion that all existing politicians are equally dishonest anyway, and by a still more general - and still more idiotic - proposal that, as all information is now equally unreliable, we live in a 'post-truth age' and may as well direct our lives by sheer chance.

All this, however, rests on a single profound lie about Human Nature, on the refusal to recognise that our species is, among all sociable species, not the most selfish and solitary but the most friendly, the most co-operative, the least naturally egoistic. The ways in which we naturally occupy ourselves have little to do with Markets. Though this utter confidence in competition and the Market might suit a society of intelligent crocodiles, it assumes a reliance on simple Selfishness which is quite irrational and out of place on the human scene. Thinly disguised as biology, this is the exciting myth which has made so many misleading books, from Hobbes's *Leviathan* to *The Selfish Gene* and *The End Of History* influential. It has not, however, improved the course of human life so far and is not likely to do so now

Mary Midgley: Style and Substance

Notes by Ian Ground and Mike Bavidge

Concrete titles

1. Not just a matter of style; nor just a device to reach a wider audience than Mind articles.

Is "Moral" A Dirty Word? (1972)

On Trying Out One's New Sword on a Chance Wayfarer (1977)

Beast And Man: The Roots of Human Nature. Routledge, 1978

Embarrassing Relatives: Changing Perceptions of Animals (1987)

Even her abstract titles have a punch to them.

Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears. Routledge, 1985;

Heart and Mind: The Varieties of Moral Experience. Routledge, 1981.

Prose

- 1) Accessible without being simplistic, forceful without being edgy.
 - We could argue that the thesis of the non-autonomous character of morality. Instead she says: "Moral is simply the superlative of serious"
 - We could argue for the thesis that it is a mistake to introduce teleology into biology or we could say Social Darwinists took "one end of the Great Chain of Being and flung it into the future"
- 2) Economy and directness e.g.

"Language is public. If you talk, you cannot possibly be the first of your kind. *I* makes sense only by contrast with *you, he, she, it* and *they*. A solipsist could not say *I*. If Descartes had thought about this, he would not have assumed that he must start his enquiry, like a doomed escapologist, from the awkward position of being locked up inside in his own consciousness, with no accomplice to release him. If we did start there, escape really would be impossible. But we don't."

History of Ideas is essential but always in the service of making philosophical progress.

- 3) Striking new images, both negative and positive: Escalators, Aquariums, kaleidoscopes, gene-juggling the inside and outside of teapots.
- 4) **How philosophy is done – and in particular how we write – is absolutely central to what we are doing.**

Pictures and Metaphors

1. Because the disputes she gets into are in the contact zone between science and ordinary life, she asks us to be sensitive to metaphors and pictures. What she calls "myths".
2. Though hardly a Wittgensteinian, she thinks that pictures hold us captive and underlie the formal arguments we use to support our theories. These pictures are much more important than the arguments. Philosophical distortions have deep roots.
3. To uproot them you have to:
 - a. Offer new pictures which will make the accepted models less captivating.
 - b. Not paint over the pictures – they had something to show us in their time - but newly curate them, and if necessary, move them to a more obscure collection.
4. **Her style reframes the pictures so that we see them afresh and produces the right kind of:**

Public Engagement

1. Philosophy engaged certainly, but not applied; at least not in the sense that the philosopher is a consultant who can be brought into debates as a neutral expert (the philosopher on the ethics committee).
2. It is matter of where she locates the philosophical debate. Does it belong in the post-grad seminar or in ordinary, if well-informed, conversations?
3. Fighting the corruption of the ordinary mind. She keeps picking fights with those who corrupt the innocent.
4. Rescuing us (our intellects, our imaginations, our language) from the fanatics.

Relation to Wittgenstein

Similarities

1. Suspicion of System and Reduction in favour of the ordinary
 - a. "...common thought and language have to be primary, because they flow from and express the way in which people actually live, while intellectual systems, however important and however influential, grow like branches out of this living thought. The systems therefore cannot simply displace or ignore it."
2. Reminding us of what we already know or what is already before us only we can't or refuse to see it.
3. Style rather than formal argument as a mean of effecting change.
4. The conceptual and the anthropological.
5. Philosophy as an ongoing task and responsibility.

Differences

1. The centrality of ethics in philosophical thought (shared with the others WWII women)
2. The cultural and political context of philosophical ideas
3. Engagement with what others think. Empirical science and the arts esp. literature.
4. Brush rather than tweezers.
5. Wit rather than irony/tone of voice.

Contributor Biographies

Hannah Marije Altorf

hm.alfortf@stmarys.ac.uk



Hannah Marije Altorf is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Mary's University, Strawberry Hill, where she was the Programme Director for 8 years. She has published on Iris Murdoch, including a book on Murdoch's notion of imagination (*Iris Murdoch and the Art of Imagining*, Continuum: 2008) and together with M.F. Willsemesen she translated *The Sovereignty of Good* into Dutch (*Over God en het Goede*, Boom: 2003) (both as Marije Altorf). Her recent interests are in the practice of philosophical dialogue, especially in the Nelson–Heckmann tradition, public philosophy in general and the work of Hannah Arendt.



Mike Bavidge

michael.bavidge@newcastle.ac.uk

Michael Bavidge was a lecturer in philosophy at the Centre for Lifelong Learning, Newcastle University. For ten years before he retired, he ran the Adult Education Programme at the university. He has written on psychopathy and the law, pain and suffering, and animal minds. With Ian Ground he wrote 'Do Animals Need a Theory of Mind?' which appeared in *Against Theory of Mind* edited by Ivan Ladar and Alan Costall (2009). *Suffering and Choice in Pain, Suffering and Healing* ed, Peter Wemyss-Gorman (2011).



Andrew Bowyer

adb69@cam.ac.uk

Andrew is a Theologian and a Chaplain at Trinity College Cambridge. He is an expert in the work of Donald MacKinnon.



Siobhan Chapman

Src@liverpool.ac.uk


I am Professor in English at the University of Liverpool, and I have previously taught at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne and the University of Kent at Canterbury. I have published a number of books on topics in linguistics and the philosophy of language, including *Paul Grice, Philosopher and Linguist* (2005), *Language and Empiricism, After the Vienna Circle* (2008) and *Susan Stebbing and the Language of Common Sense* (2013).



Sophia Connell

sme1000@cam.ac.uk

Sophia Connell (BA McGill, MPhil, PhD Cambridge) is a Philosophy Lecturer at Newnham College and a Fellow at Selwyn College. She has taught Philosophy in Cambridge for over a decade. Her area of specialisation is Ancient Philosophy, in particular, Aristotle. She is beginning a research project of women philosophers in the analytic tradition in Cambridge, working with archival materials.



Christopher Coope

C.M.Coope@leeds.ac.uk

I grew up in a large family. It was joyously argumentative. Little wonder then that I eventually found my way into philosophy. My application to study philosophy at Manchester was however rejected, as was entirely reasonable, so I signed up on the instant for psychology, a perfectly useless subject but preferable to national service. After my degree I went on to take the B. Phil. In Philosophy at Oxford where I played in a jazz band. From there I joined the Department at Leeds, promptly marrying the colleague appointed on the same day. Since then, apart from looking after the children, I have amused myself by writing a book and several papers, all the while struggling with the Bach 48.



Luna Dolezal

l.r.dolezal@exeter.ac.uk

Luna Dolezal is a lecturer in medical humanities and philosophy at the University of Exeter. Her research is primarily in the areas of applied phenomenology, feminist philosophy, philosophy of embodiment, philosophy of medicine and medical humanities (esp. through literature and philosophy). Luna was a founding member of SWIP Ireland. She was previously based at Durham University as an Irish Research Council/Marie Curie Research Fellow. During this time she worked with Rachael Wiseman and Clare MacCumhail to set up In Parenthesis.



Ian Ground

ianground@mac.com

Dr Ian Ground was born in London, read philosophy at Newcastle University, where he was taught by Mary and Geoff Midgley and Jane Heal. In a range of roles, including Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Ian has taught philosophy at the Newcastle, Sunderland, Durham and the Open University and for the Royal School of Veterinary Studies in Edinburgh.

Ian's research interests include aesthetics and the philosophy of art, the philosophy of mind especially as this has implications for our understanding of animal psychology and cognition and on the thought and life of Ludwig Wittgenstein. His books include *Art or Bunk?* and (with Michael Bavidge) *Can We Understand Animal Minds?* and he regularly reviews titles in philosophy for the Times Literary Supplement.

His most recent publications include *Minding Animals* for the recent Festschrift for Mary Midgley and a new edition of *Portraits of Wittgenstein* (Bloomsbury Academic Press 2015) - a comprehensive collection of memoirs, including new contributions from Mary Midgley and Mary Warnock. Ian is currently Vice-President of the British Wittgenstein Society and Visiting Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire.



Jane Heal

bjh100@cam.ac.uk

Jane Heal studied for her first degree in Cambridge, reading History for two years and then Philosophy (or "Moral Sciences" as it was called in those days) for another two years. She also took her Ph.D. at Cambridge, working on problems on the philosophy of language. After two years post doctoral study in the US (at Princeton and Berkeley) she was appointed to a lectureship at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. Having taught there for several years she moved back to Cambridge where she is now a Fellow of St John's College. She was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1997.



Jen Hornsby

j.hornsby@bbk.ac.uk

Jennifer Hornsby's BA, MPhil and PhD are from Oxford, London and Cambridge respectively. She was a founder member of the Centre for the Study of the Mind in Nature, Oslo, and, until it closes (in May), remains CoDirector of its Rational Agency section. She is Emeritus Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford where she was a Tutorial Fellow from 1978 until she moved to Birkbeck in 1995. She publishes and teaches in philosophies of mind, action, language, and in feminist philosophy and in metaphysics. She used to be an avid reader of Iris Murdoch's novels; she much enjoys reading the work of Mary Midgley and of Philippa Foot; and she's come to think the world of Anscombe's writings.



Nakul Krishna

nk459@cam.ac.uk

Nakul Krishna is an Unestablished Lecturer in the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge and a Fellow of Robinson College. He is writing a history of Oxford philosophy after the war.



Miles Leeson

m.leeson@chi.ac.uk

Miles Leeson is Director of the Iris Murdoch Research Centre at the University of Chichester, and Iris Murdoch Archive Fellow at the University of Kingston. He is the Lead Editor of the *Iris Murdoch Review* and co-ordinates the Iris Murdoch Society. His monograph *Iris Murdoch: Philosophical Novelist* was published by Bloomsbury Continuum in 2010, and his latest work is a co-edited collection entitled *Incest in Contemporary Fiction* MUP, 2017.



Clare MacCumhaill

Clare is a philosopher of mind, working mostly on perception, but with interests in emotion and action, as well as aspects of the metaphysics of mind, and in topics relating to aesthetics. Clare is a founding member of the (S)PIN research collective which brings together philosophers of perception in the north. She is an investigator on the In Parenthesis project.



Liz McKinnell

Liz McKinnell teaches philosophy at Durham University. Her principal research interests are in ethics, political philosophy, literature, and environmental philosophy. She is the co-editor of *Science and the Self: Essays in Honour of Mary Midgley*



Mary Midgley

dr.mary.midgley@googlemail.com

Mary was a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Newcastle University and is known for her work on science, ethics and animal rights. She wrote her first book, *Beast And Man* (1978), when she was in her fifties. Subsequently, she has written over 15 other books, including *Animals And Why They Matter* (1983), *Wickedness* (1984), *The Ethical Primate* (1994), *Evolution as a Religion* (1985), and *Science as Salvation* (1992). She has been awarded honorary doctorates by Durham and Newcastle universities. Her autobiography, *The Owl of Minerva*, was published in 2005.



Evgenia Mylonaki

evg.mylonaki@gmail.com

Evgenia teaches philosophy at the Hellenic Open University and at the American study abroad program, College Year in Athens, CYA. Her doctoral research centred on what the possibility of divided agency tells us about rationality and motivation. Her post-doctoral research centres on the connection between practical knowledge and moral perception. She is currently working on issues in practical reasoning, ethical and political intentionality and human and animal life.



Maarten Steenhagen

maartensteehagen@gmail.com

Maarten Steenhagen is a Lecturer in philosophy at the University of Cambridge, and a Bye-Fellow of Queens' College. His research focuses on perception and the mind. He has published articles in *Philosophical Studies* and *Collingwood and British Idealism Studies*, and is currently investigating mediated forms of perception and optical technologies.



Rachael Wiseman

rachael.wiseman@durham.ac.uk

Rachael Wiseman is Addison Wheeler Research Fellow at Durham University. Along with Clare MacCumhaill and Luna Dolezal she is a founder of In Parenthesis. She recently published *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Anscombe's Intention*.



Frances White

fcpwhite@hotmail.com

Dr Frances White is Deputy Director of the Iris Murdoch Research Centre and Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Chichester, Editor of the *Iris Murdoch Review* (Kingston University Press) and Writer in Residence at Kingston University, London. Her prize-winning short biography *Becoming Iris Murdoch* was published in 2014 and she is currently working on the sequel, *Unbecoming Iris Murdoch* (forthcoming, KUP, 2019).

Workshop Attendees


1. Hannah Marije Altorf; hm.alfortf@stmarys.ac.uk
2. Sarah J. Banks; s.j.banks@durham.ac.uk
3. Mike Bavidge; michael.bavidge@newcastle.ac.uk
4. Andrew Bowyer; adb69@cam.ac.uk
5. Siobhan Chapman; Src@liverpool.ac.uk
6. Sophia Connell; sme1000@cam.ac.uk
7. Christopher Coope; C.M.Coope@leeds.ac.uk
8. Luna Dolezal; l.r.dolezal@exeter.ac.uk
9. Ian Ground; ianground@mac.com
10. Andy Hamilton; a.j.hamilton@durham.ac.uk
11. Jane Heal; bjh1000@cam.ac.uk
12. Jen Hornsby; j.hornsby@bbk.ac.uk
13. Nakul Krishna; nk459@cam.ac.uk
14. Miles Leeson; m.leeson@chi.ac.uk
15. Clare MacCumhail; Clare.maccumhail@durham.ac.uk
16. Liz McKinnell; elizabeth.mckinnell@durham.ac.uk
17. Mary Midgley; dr.mary.midgley@googlemail.com
18. David Midgley; david@schumacher-north.co.uk
19. Martin Midgley; martin.midgley@gmail.com
20. Tom Midgley; midgley.tom@gmail.com
21. Evgenia Mylonaki; evg.mylonaki@gmail.com
22. Paula Satne; paula.satne@manchester.ac.uk
23. Ben Smith; b.w.smith@durham.ac.uk
24. Maarten Steenhagen; maartensteehagen@gmail.com]
25. Francoise Wemelsfelder; Francoise.Wemelsfelder@sruc.ac.uk
26. Frances White; fcpwhite@hotmail.com
27. Rachael Wiseman; rachael.wiseman@durham.ac.uk

Directions and Information

Rachael Wiseman: 07796 157355

Clare MacCumbiall: 0776 990004

Friday Evening



Amber Films, Side Cinema

5-9 Side,
Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 3JE, UK
0191 232 2000
www.amber-online.com/side-cinema/

Ury Restaurant

27 Queen St,
Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 3UG
0191 232 7799
www.uryrestaurants.com/

Newcastle Taxis

Blueline: 0191 262 6666
Fenham: 0191 272 2722



Saturday



Lindisfarne Centre, St Aidan's College
Windmill Hill
Durham
DH1 3LJ

Tel College Reception: 0191 334 5769
Tel Rachael Wiseman: 07796 157355

St Aidan's is a 5 minute taxi ride from Durham Station. The walk from the station through town is picturesque and will take about 30 minutes. There are parking spaces available in the College -- please ask for a permit at reception.



Jumping Bean Café

5 Neville St
Durham
DH1 4EY

Durham Taxis: 0191 364 3665